The subject of consciousness



Introduction

§ 1 The interior of being we experience of becoming. What is it? A five sensory flow, heterogeneous and yet coordinated a succession of emotions and thoughts. What we see, we call world, while the conglomerate of wills, acts of our body, ideas and emotions that we perceive "us" we are accustomed to consider as ourselves. Spontaneously consists belief "I am in the world," implicit foundation of all our other judgments,

tacit institution of a duality. But if we characterize it: "what defines the world, me and their border?", Is a serious embarrassment. Overall, these constitutions are played around the body and its own accidents invisible (and could we name the psychic phenomena). Our purpose is to question the validity of these distinctions in order to achieve an overview of the subject real authentic. Leaving aside as necessary the pole world, whereas there is a principle earlier about the pole, while questioning the meaning of this priority. What we want is a real ontology of the topic, purified concerns strictly psychological and naturalists, although this blueprint is part of the project. We rely for that on some of the achievements of phenomenology, mainly the reduction, as well as the work of Merleau-Ponty, which seems one of the deepest introductions and innovative in the field. However, a gap appears in the determination of subjectivity as such. [Patocka writes: "It should be noted weaknesses in the theory of" ego ", which in theory Husserl continues to evolve, never come to a final determination." Q.P.? p. 178] Therefore
we propose a radical redirection of philosophy in its essence, like to take center point of departure and arrival, the question of the subject. Yet this regard, we characterize the first as consciousness, and we may assume that the history of philosophy is the history of such determination, awareness of consciousness itself through d a succession of conceptual developments, which are both "revelations" and distortions of its own essence. Our work will be largely a fundamental criticism of any attempt to conceptualization of consciousness. The initial paradox that such a project raises makes sense when one considers that the subject is not primarily a concept but a reality, or better: the foundation of any possible reality, the place of the dark genesis and the gift of being. The concepts are only modes of apprehension of the subject itself, one of the areas of global experience, and probably not the most primitive and the most authentic. One of our theories is that there can be no adequate representation possible of conscience nor about the existence and representation.

§ 2 We take our account of the interrogation which opens Being and time by specifying that the question of Being must be seized like to be the first person, I be, because ' is from the ego that are all covered, and it is always in him and from him that is being lived, seen and thought. And if the ego is an illusion, the whole issue will be to understand the status of this illusion. But the paradox is that the first ego is a later one being among others, and another by which the Dasein happens or Dasein itself: I'm here. But it is not a location nor a "situation" within the meaning of Sartre and we consider these words from a proper ontological. We reject even a point kierkegaardienne vision of life which insists that it is existence of a being finished, or even that it is finished and synthesis of infinity,
the temporal and eternal, and so on. For us these concepts are post-existence Gross we be in its broadest sense and more neutral, and given our sole departure is "I am, I exist". We do not reject the phénoménalité, we believe it is only included in our being: I am a person who receives. We must therefore understand and explore the nature of the phenomenon, but the connection constantly about it. In particular own body and flesh phenomena are fundamental conditions for the possibility of phénoménalité, but again the carnal and perceptions are an integral part of my life, and it is this light it is understand them. The distinction of mind and body is an abstract distinction, and perhaps even of self and the world, but these divisions are taking place in the homogeneous medium of my conscience and always assume a more profound that could be perceived or to establish. We therefore fundamental as the attempted characterization of a non-dualism préconceptuel, while we are wary of the various temptations monist direct positions are conceptual: no concept seems to sum up or shut existence, not even those of conscience or existence. We can say that everything is and that everything that appears appears in the conscience or for her, but tautology is not the truth: there is a dialectic of evidence that occurs through concepts and constructs, and we do intend nothing less than a new phenomenology of the mind.

§ 3 Can we predict from the opening of its results, or even expect a positive result? It can be argued that all great works of philosophy aimed determination and acquisition of freedom [This is the thesis of Mr. Craig Nichols that does not otherwise Sein und Zeit (Primordial Freedom: The Authentic Truth of Dasein in Heidegger's' Being and Time 'in: Thinking Fundamentals, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences, Vol. 9: Vienna 2000)] through a deep understanding of the nature of being. We will return in time on this allegation, and n'invoquons here as witnesses provisional
The first books of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. At a more modest level, we see another direction would be superficial, and that our characterization of the test subject should confront this issue ethical and metaphysical. If I want to know what I am, it is imperative to know if I am free. If my being is to be pure consciousness, then it is certain, as set out in Sartre's transcendence of the ego, that I turn pure freedom, but the question is what this means, even if we débouchons Bergson as a direct intuition of freedom itself. Being the world but is not disavowal condition of freedom, or, more profoundly, synonymous. My body is one of the phenomena of nature, but nature itself is the set of phenomena that occur in my conscience, their order and their connection brings about the idea of laws, which in turn produces the idea of determinism. If I am my body, I am not free an animal or a plant, and if I am my soul, can be seen as Schopenhauer it obeys a causal equally strict. But these speculations involve a concept of freedom closely linked to action and will. From the point of view phenomenological to be ours, acts and volition are anything other than a certain type of phenomena within my conscience. The freedom that we will not talk phenomenal, without being transcendental in the sense of Kant because, for short, we see only a concept. We bet it just a question on the nature of the topic so that issues "adjacent" such as freedom s'éclaircissent themselves.

§ 4 This means that we give as much as possible in the hope of a result, the establishment of a predetermined thesis, but believe that our purpose simply requires a course interrogative, a survey on the nature of about the existence of this reflection and even a process of unveiling what is already there and will always be identical when the research ends. We therefore an assumption of permanence, which defuses the idea of substantial progress: our concepts evolve but one witness who is aware of this development. Usually, the philosophy focuses its attention on it and identifies the adventures of its concepts, but is it not possible to remain in the vigilance of their source? We therefore as a currency that word Merleau-Ponty: "Philosophy is not a certain knowledge, it is this vigilance that leaves us not forget the source of all knowledge." Of course this source is not pure consciousness within the meaning of abstract, it encompasses all spheres of my existence, the Incarnation and intersubjectivity, but what we propose is precisely an expansion and redefinition of the concept of conscience, because we believe it is behind the countless theories that seem to be on a different subject: the soul, intellect, reason, mind, the mind, and so on. You can go so far as to say that philosophy has always treated the same subject matter primarily through various instantiations, or the philosopher inevitably reflects on itself, and it is still ultimately to understand what consciousness. And in this regard, it will look closely at this axiom that is consciously self-consciousness, and that other famous, Husserl, that "conscience is aware of something." Does this mean that subject and object are inherently present in the consciousness? Are they real or elements of abstract distinctions? What is a conscience without object, and can it exist without a subject? One major focus of this study will be whether we should identify and awareness about, and if there is an issue "behind" or beyond the sphere aware of what it can be. When Descartes discovered the absolute certainty of his being and wondered who he is, it responds quickly enough res cogitans, then returned several times to the amazement of the eureka. The short list, which specifies that notion suggests that it is the modern sense of the word conscience: Sed quid igitur sum? Cogitans Res. What is hoc? NEMP dubitans, intelligens, affirmans, negans, VOLENS, Nolen, IMAGINAN quoque, & sentiens. (Med. II, 8) Instead of trying to understand its nature or essence, Descartes simply lists his actions. And in its perspective, that's enough. But for us, this multiple plunges us into an embarrassment Socratic Certainly, the following acts or faculties of the mind, and it is intuitively obvious that I will certainly understand, says, denies, want, want not , And imagine sense, but how a variety of heterogeneous if it can be seized in a unit if it? This unit is all that plus a variety of cogitatum is wide, or rather, this unity is all the more surprising. And it is probably a présynthétique: even if the perceptions and reflections place by synthesis, the subject of these acts do not seem to be the product of a synthesis, under penalty of a regression to infinity. Certainly, the empirical ego seems aggrégat synthesis memory, but it is the idea that I myself, closely linked to the history of my body and my judgments, and not at all the ego of pure cogito, for what is in this lifetime of the aperception. From it, there is no history or perhaps description, making it difficult to speak to him, and also there should not have cut deep, radical separation between both directions of the ego: it is pure cogito me that I am living this psycho-physical that I see all the time. The concept is at such a consideration is that of identification. The charge becomes a way to be transitive or attributes of the verb: I become, I am what I perceive, consciousness absorbs and lost in the history of the body. Conversely, awareness and n'advenir seems to take itself that when a body and through its neural functioning. However, if the body was actually the subject, we referred to the difficulties of hylozoïsme. Taking the key concept of conscience, we hope to avoid the major pitfalls of dualism and the temptation to substantiver the topic either side of the field, either side of the mind. We proceed from that fact that we are aware of one or the other, and this assumption that consciousness is leaving lock in any category. When Descartes concludes with a vague grandiose ego aliquid sum, we translate aliquid by conscience and try to dig this arid zone of incipient and meditation.

§ 5 The sphere of subjectivity from is indeed the slightest extension, it can be summed up in the whole word I, but we can also say with Husserl it is a "huge area , As we shall see-the transcendental experience of me. " (MC § 13 p.59) What this area lacks in terms of wealth of objects describable, it compensates subtle and important. What value
to my science and my action if I do not know who I am, I who understands and act? Our motto is to return all the assumptions and concepts to question them, the Who? Thus this region of our investigation is austere, but endless, because this issue is
still strong, and after many years of research, we find that it has lost none of its freshness, on the contrary it is gaining steadily in depth and resonance. Rather than having to decide between competing theories, we often deal with oscillations between prospects inseparable. In a sense, the question of the subject does not decide if materialism or idealism, and so on. which is "true" because these systems are referred outside of the topic, and thus a form of digression, even entertainment serious that I consider as valid any theory does not really change, and perhaps don ' nothing on my own nature. We try to sail as far established theories as possible, which is certainly a risk, because the careful study of texts is fertile and full of virtues, but all these reflections about the nature of the mind come from ' direct observations and enjoignet do they not emulate their approach rather than dissect their results? One of the strengths of philosophy is that its object is always at our disposal, we are still immersed in life and its dimensions are irremovable, an eternal availability, and this is especially true when s' is the topic: we are never far from us, except by imagination. And the distance paradox is also one of the themes of our interrogation. But then, perhaps it is this proximity limit, this coincidence inalienable which is a major obstacle epistemological. All matters of knowledge are indeed objective, and only the Who am I? is subjective, and in a sense insoluble. Because all answers are projected to meet my gaze inside, expelled in the exteriority mental when they are made. Our determination is likely to occur on an essentially negative, and we learn to guess what we are successively eliminating all that we do not and probably will get us no further than the congratulatory ironic Thééthète to Socrates, to be become lighter and not disturb others and ourselves believing what we know. (And it seems to us that Merleau-Ponty is both a pioneer and master in this style of writing that could appoint non-thétique). Everything revolves around the so gnwqi seauton, in a non-philosophical hope, because how can we, after so many centuries and minds far more brilliant, providing any light that is both new and true, which falls extravagance not in the pretext of originality, nor in the darkness conceals a lack of substance? Yet, after extensive discussion the company, we can not solve a simple review of past theories, or even their confrontation in a spirit of gloss. As the young Spinoza said that, as thin as his chances are he may not seek to cure some deadly disease, we believe that fundamental determination is the subject most worthy of our concern, without which science and philosophy would be vitiated by a vanity dirrimante. If both studies and sometimes agonizing cogitations does not tell us what we are and what may be our freedom and our happiness, why continue and support this hassle. There is certainly a pleasure immediate speculation and we see the good sense of Hume for whom it is part of the proper use of life for the honest man, but a deeper dimension is more burning is also open. Maybe we lose this illusion in our study, but if this loss is included in the invincible nature of things, then this will be no small benefit, or recognition of the futility of any intellectual benefit.

§ 6 There is an ontological dimension of incompleteness: the subject is never complete, its development is still ongoing, his life is always discussed in medias res. And there he is to grasp, even to grasp its essence, through its finitude and temporality. Does this mean he is a being-for-dead? What do we know about death? Is this not a concept, something we have no direct experience? I discovered as being-in-the-time, or be best for whom time is, and it is certain that I can not separate my being in my time, but conversely, I can not conceive or less receive the flow time out of my subjectivity. It is a form of a priori intuition, the part of any experience. But I see that the three modes of temporality, I am time? If I fully coincided with his movement, how I perceive? There must be "dehiscence" in the heart of being time, some internal resistance, like that which is perceptible effort, according to the analysis of Maine Biran. Is this the body? This is not so simple because the body is already in the physical time and it would then ask another form of temporality, mental, and then try to understand their articulation. This hypothesis is plausible, but remains the question of conscience same time, which is certainly high road of exploration of subjectivity. Yet there may be here
for some offense of abstraction, and so should we back this time analysis on the world, which is one of the fundamental dimensions. I see not a pure time, but a global world to be a being-in-becoming, I can then decompose spatial, temporal, otherness, and so on. We therefore take the party not to separate our analysis of time than space, as the Phenomenology of Perception chose to do so, and the rest, any guidance contemporary science invites us to such a unification. The problem is that any clarification us to notional divisions, which reveal the functional unit and real purpose of our analysis, this world "in which" we are.
All of our language comes from abstract metaphors, and certainly, if our soul is also a spontaneous metaphor of our bodily life, it is capable of proper speech, or at least congruent: oneira anti oneiratoj. If the soul is not real, its attempts to understand and describe themselves are nevertheless in the same sphere, and thus fingerprints on legitimacy. What ever wanted idealistic thinking for centuries, there was no rational certainty as the basis of being and language are not free of contingency, the very status of knowledge is deeply ambiguous, principles and guarantees are also concepts. The feeling alone is not hypothetical. Both I feel myself, which is my only guideline, but quickly gets lost in circumvolutions of speculation but when I want to think directly, the concepts m'embarrassent, focus my attention recede in te ipse seems able to prohibit its depth use of language, or at least my confidence in him. Yet we must do, and rather than dismiss it, explore Merleau-Ponty as its constitutive ambiguity. It is certain that it is or origin, or on current employment suited to expressing the nature of the topic. The I, the first person is a basic grammar, but its clearly apparent disconcerting thought, and we can also think with Nietzsche it commits us on the wrong track, inviting us to hypostasize and review what has not reality. If we have no right to substantiver I, I said, the ego, our business seems to lose its value, but it is in that we are going by asking each other: if I is illusion, how to understand its birth and its central status? (Conversely, if the real me is how to account for its elusive?) We say I referring to the subject, because it is he who must be behind this statement, as Kant wrote that I thought "should be accompany all my representations "and the verb indicates less need for the presence of a difficulty. The cogito is crucial to the cerebration, or is it a logical deduction, an abstract assumption made at the situation, which is the presence of multiple representations in the fields of our consciousness ? The Greeks attributed the thunder and rain to Zeus, and most people do the same with other names, other myths. We attribute the phenomena spontaneously to a source, a cause, an author. Such as I in relation to mental events; establishment of a deity neutral and discreet, a division elusive, caput mortuum Introspection of a rapid and socially, linguistically induced. "It is the belief that only a living and thinking can-do belief in want, to the intent - is the belief that whatever happens is done, any act that requires an author, but Belief in the "subject". This belief in the concept of the subject and attribute not be a great folly? "(VP I section 142) But it's also why a study of the status of subjectivity is needed, since all other beliefs based on it, if it vanishes to measure our progress, n 'we have not acquired a unique clarity? And if the concepts of matter and consciousness are unfit, we will lead a study on the fate of being born and which they operate. Our search for the essence of any subject is both an attempt determination of a subjective, as its focal point is the hinge of staff and the impersonal, and the representative in the self-assumed character. While working for the concepts of self-and in-itself, we try to
beyond their embarrassing duality, holding that everything is for-itself, since in-itself is one of my intellectual set, and that each sphere conscious can take place only within a being . But perhaps this last assumption already too, and we may discover that there is infinite and incomprehensible impersonal subjectivity, in which subjects and objects are apparent and break waves at the whim of fate in a unit still unstable, but irrevocable.

§ 7 We talked existential analysis of the topic which dissipate the powerful prerogative of consciousness in its general sense, this implies a consideration of the terms in which the problem arises. As Merleau-Ponty in an unpublished material (BN 40b) "We never thought life if we do not think the birth and death. The inability to think in terms of cogito is the condemnation of cogito - At least proof that he is not the ultimate formula. "